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Most citizens of the world today are fighting for – either by 
battling  viruses,  spam,  phishing  or  other  malware,  or  by  
fending  off  schemes  to  compromise  privacy  and  extract  
confidential  information.  With  these  worries  in  mind,  the  
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) was established to develop 
specifications  for  trusted  computing  building  blocks  and 
software interfaces that could address the problems and aims  
to enhance security by using the transitive properties of trust.  
Unfortunately Trusted Computing is a young technology and 
struggling  with  some  drawbacks.  There  are  major  issues  
related  to  technical  as  well  commercial  that  need  to  be 
addressed seriously and carefully.  From user’s perspective,  
TC was introduced from desire to prevent users from freely  
sharing  and  using  potentially  technology  and  seems  will  
introduce more benefits  to vendors and large corporations. 
The main legal concerns are copyright, anti-trust law, data 
privacy  law and digital  rights  management,  the  impact  on  
which  are  not  yet  clear.   This  paper  will  discuss  the  
challenges that currently faced with Trusted Computing in all  
aspects  from  different  perspective  and  at  the  same  time  
provide several solutions to overcome the challenges.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
There are many promising approaches to improve security in 
computing environment in all possible angles and aspects eg. 
redesigning  operating  systems,  changing  programming 
methodologies,  or  altering  the  PC's  hardware  itself.  This 
broad  term as  well  as  scope  drives  a  mix  of  initiatives  by 
individual processor manufacturers, software makers, service 
providers, networking and Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEM)  to  respond  to  the  well-known  security  challenges. 
Microsoft  has started with a software-based project  referred 
as the Microsoft Next-Generation Secure Computing Base, or 
NGSCB which specifies software changes that take advantage 
of the security benefits made available by a planned new PC 
hardware design (Schoen, 2003). On the other hand, Intel and 
AMD are in midst of developing a processor-based solution 
namely  as  Intel's  LaGrande  Technology  (LT)  and  AMD's 
Secure  Execution  Mode  (SEM)  respectively  in  order  to 
provide  hardware  support  needed  for  all  the  major  feature 
groups in NGSCB.
Therefore a single body or organisation is crucially needed to 
streamline  end-to-end  trusted  platform  requirements  and  to 
further  drive  in  developing  standard  guidelines  and 
specifications.  As a result in 8th April  2003,  a not-for-profit 
industry-standards  organization  namely  as  Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG) was formed to develop, define, and 
promote  open,  vendor-neutral  industry  specifications  for 
trusted computing (Intel Whitepaper, 2003).
2.0 OVERVIEW OF TRUSTED COMPUTING
The demand that gave birth to the trusted computing system 
normally originated from military or security related agencies. 
They  are  the  users  or  groups  that  are  very  cautious  about 
every single aspect of security threats to their operations and 
organizations.  Therefore  most  of  trusted  computing  system 
has been developed according to military security models and 
requirements.  A  secure  military  personal  computers  built 
from  common  off-the-shelf  components  has  been  a  long 
dream of the military and security agencies world-wide as it’s 
would save large amounts of money. Common requirements 
of such a system are as follows (Challener & Yoder, 2008)  :
• Any  data  on  the  system  must  be  wiped  out  both 
before and after it is used 
• The system must be able to securely identify itself
• The user must be able to securely identify himself
• Information passed to the system must not be visible 
during the transfer
• Confidential information on the system must not be 
available to other processes running on the system
All of these objectives could be accomplished as follows. A 
system is designed that  has no hard disk,  but  lots of RAM. 
This  is  becoming  more  doable  now that  64-bit  architecture 
chips are shipping, but even 2 gigabytes of RAM is sufficient 
for most  purposes  especially the fact  that  RAM is easier to 
erase than a hard disk. The machine boots to the network over 
an IPSec  card and  a server  at  the other  end loads  a secure 
operating  system  into  the  RAM.  These  requirements  have 
motivate most of sectors related to trusted computing system 
to innovate or create an integrated  platform  that cover the 
criteria. It may now be possible to build such a system using a 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) module at its core.
The  basis  of  Trusted  Computing,  as  defined  by  TCG,  is  a 
collection  of  one  or  more  security  devices  that  can  be 
embedded  within  a  Trusted  Computing  Platform.  The  first 
device  defined  by TCG is the TPM,  which  is encapsulated 
within  a  Trusted  Computing  Platform  by  affixing  a  single 
chip  to  the  motherboard  or  embedding  the  functionality 
within  another  silicon  component.  The  TPM  is  typically  a 
microcontroller  that  stores  passwords,  digital  keys,  and 
certificates  to  provide  unique  identification.  Either  a 
standalone integrated circuit (IC) or embedded in another IC 
such  as  an  Ethernet  controller,  the  TPM  uses  standard 
software  interfaces  to  work  with  other  security  methods  to 
deploy secure applications.
The other critical supporting component in completing trusted 
computing  model  is  TCG Software  Stack  (TSS).  TSS  is  a 
module  that  similar  to  Microsoft  Next-Generation  Secure 
Computing Base module, or NGSCB.  The TSS is comprised 
of  modules  and  components  that  provide  the  supporting 
functionality  to the  TPM.  Based  on the TCG specification, 
certain functions and services are outside of the scope of the 
TPM hardware.  These  functions  and  services  are  delivered 
using the host  CPU and system memory. The TSS provides 
the necessary software architecture to support the offloading 
of  security  functions  from  the  TPM to  the  main  CPU and 
memory resources of the system.  TSS communications with 
the  TPM  can  occur  either  locally  or  remotely.  The  TSS 
provides a standard set of application programming interfaces 
(APIs) so that application vendors can use the TPM.
2.1 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
The  Trusted  Platform  Module  (TPM)  is  a   hardware  chip 
based   installed  on  PC,  PDA  and  mobile  phones 
motherboards to deliver enhance platform security above and 
beyond  the  capabilities  of  today’s  software  and   provides 
hardware-based protection hardware component that securely 
stores digital keys, certificates and passwords. Figure 1 shows 
the  Trusted  Platform  Module  (TPM)  will  be  a  mandatory 
component to be installed in all devices such as PCs, PDAs 
and  mobile  phones  to  achieve  trusted  computing  platform 
objective (TCG Group, 2007).
    
Figure 1: Component installed in devices containing a TCG Trusted 
Platform Module (TCG Group, 2007)
TPMs protect  encryption  keys and digital  signature  keys to 
maintain  data  confidentiality.  TPM  chips  are  designed  to 
protect  key  operations  and  other  security  tasks  that  would 
otherwise  be  performed  on  unprotected  interfaces  in 
unprotected communications. TPMs are specifically designed 
to protect  platform and user authentication  information  and 
unencrypted  keys  from  software-based  attacks.  Figure  2 
shows  eleven  components  embedded  into  a  single  TPM 
platform.   The  components  are  Input/Output(I/O),  Non-
Volatile  Storage,  Platform  Configuration  Registers(PCR), 
Attestation  Identity  Key(AIK),  Program  Code,  Random 
Number  Generator(RNG),  SHA-1 Engine,  Key  Generation, 
RSA  Engine,  Opt-In  and  Execution  Engine  (TCG  Group, 
2007).
Figure 2: TPM Component Architecture (TCG Group 2007)
2.2 TCG Software Stack (TSS)
Access and control of the TPM operations occurs through the 
TCG  Software  Stack  (TSS)  interface.  TSS  refers  to  the 
supporting  software  of  TPM  which  supports  the  access  of 
applications to the TPM[6]. The TSS provides a standard set 
of  application  programming  interfaces  (APIs)  so  that 
application developers can use the TPM, such as Microsoft® 
CryptoAPI,  the Intel® Common Data Security Architecture, 
and  the  RSA  Security  Public-Key  Cryptography  Standard 
#11.  In  this  way,  the  TSS  helps  enable  TPM  support  for 
applications using these APIs. Application developers can use 
the TSS to create interoperable client applications designed to 
improve  tamper-resistant  computing  by taking advantage  of 
TPM capabilities such as key backup, key migration, platform 
authentication, and attestation (Molsberry & Berger, 2006).
The TSS is composed of three logical layers: the TCG device 
driver library (TDDL), the TCG core service (TCS), and the 
TCG  service  provider  (TSP),  each  layer  has  its  own 
standardized  definition  of  interfaces  (Challener  &  Yoder, 
2008).   The  TSP  works  as  the  trusted  agent  of  local  and 
remote applications,  while the TCS as a trusted server.  The 
TDDL is a library that provides an API to interface with the 
TPM device driver.
3.0 POSSIBLE  FEATURES  IN  TRUSTED 
COMPUTING PLATFORM
The  Trusted  Computing  (TC)  offers  several  features  over 
proprietary  hardware  security  solutions,  and  inherently, 
hardware security is stronger than software-only approaches. 
Existing research shows that the TC can be used to establish 
trust in the software executing on a computer.
3.1 Storage Protection
This  threat  arises  from  the  fact  that  mobile  devices  or 
notebook  computers  are  more  susceptible  to be stolen  than 
their  desktop  counterparts.  Once  stolen,  notebooks  can  be 
subject to a variety of hardware as well as software attacks. It 
is often found that the stolen data is more valuable than just 
the cost of the notebook hardware (Bajikar, 2002).
TCG  has  introduced  a  Trusted  Computing  Platform  (TCP) 
that  serve  a  feature  of  trusted  drive  that  encrypts  all  data 
directly  on the  drive  and  the  encryption  speed matches  the 
throughput of the drive interface so the process is essentially 
unobservable  to  the  user  in  normal  operation.  If  a  trusted 
drive is stolen, repurposed, or taken out of service, it remains 
protected. Simple user and security ID keys make end of life 
and repurposing instantaneous and secure. In the enterprise, a 
trusted  storage  system  allows  authorized  access  to  critical 
data while preventing unauthorized access or modification of 
that data.
In  addition  to  an unobservable  cryptographic  processing  of 
secrets  and  use  of  custom  logic  to  provide  fast,  secure 
operation for the cryptographic functions, protecting data on a 
hard drive requires tight access control for secret information. 
Once  again,  the  TCP  provides  the  key  with  its  hardware-
based key generating capability.
3.2 Secure Online Transaction
Notebooks often operate outside of corporate firewalls. Also, 
they  use  various  means  of  communication  to  access  the 
corporate network or the Internet. There are a number of ways 
in which a determined hacker can attack the communication 
channel  used  by  the  notebook  to  steal  the  data  being 
transceived  (Bajikar, 2002). 
To protect  customer and employee data from Internet-based 
attacks,  Personal  information  Manager  (PIM)  software, 
secured by the hardware based chip in TCP, isolates contact 
information,  passwords,  bank  access  codes,  and  credit  card 
numbers.  With multi-factor  authentication,  some  employees 
reach their programs with a single factor while others require 
at  least  dual-factor authentication  for  network  access, 
providing  the  appropriate  level  of  security  for  each 
department.
Instead of using third-party vendors to encrypt content before 
backing it up, these transactions are now performed locally in 
house.  With  encryption  keys  residing  locally  in  the  TCP, 
copies are automatically passed to the Key Transfer Manager 
Server providing both protected and recoverable information.
3.3 Data and network protector from virus and malware
In  today’s  security  environment,  a  worm,  virus  or  other 
malware  on  a  PC  that  connects  to  the  network  can  easily 
spread across  it. Relying on anti-virus and personal  firewall 
software for portable computers is not acceptable for a secure 
corporate network. An authorized user can gain access to the 
network  from an external  site to simply check email.  If  the 
user’s  computer  has  a virus  or  rootkit,  a software  tool  that 
conceals  running  processes,  these  unwanted  software  items 
can spread to the network. By taking advantage of the TCP, 
deceptive  or  lying  endpoints  can  be  detected.  Using  the 
hardware-based  security  of  the  TCP  for  integrity 
measurement  and  remote  attestation,  the  limitations  of 
software-based protection can be overcome.  With the TCP, 
the specification establishes a level of trust in the state of an 
endpoint  and also ensures the presence,  status, and software 
version of mandated applications.
3.4 Digital rights management
Trusted Computing would allow companies to create a digital 
rights  management  system  which  would  be  very  hard  to 
circumvent,  though  not  impossible.  An  example  is 
downloading a music file. Remote attestation could be used 
so  that  the  music  file  would  refuse  to  play  except  on  a 
specific  music  player  that  enforces  the  record  company's 
rules. Sealed storage would prevent the user from opening the 
file  with  another  player  or  another  computer.  The  music 
would be played in curtained memory, which would prevent 
the user from making an unrestricted copy of the file while it 
is playing,  and secure  I/O would prevent  capturing  what  is 
being sent to the sound system. Circumventing such a system 
would  require  either  manipulation  of  the  computer's 
hardware,  capturing  the  analogue  (and  possibly  degraded) 
signal using a recording device or a microphone, or breaking 
the encryption algorithm (TCG Group, 2009).
4.0 CHALLENGES OF TRUSTED COMPUTING
It is clear that trusted computing hardware provides security 
benefits  when  nicely  blended  with  right  software  that  is 
prepared to take advantage of it. But trusted computing has 
been received skeptically and remains controversial. Some of 
the controversy is based on misconceptions, but much of it is 
relevance. There  are  too  many  troubling  aspects  of  TC  to 
ignore,  here's more about risks involved in TC.
Any hardware component,  including the TC hardware itself, 
has the potential to fail, or be upgraded and replaced. A user 
might  rightly  conclude  that  the  mere  possibility  of  being 
irrevocably cut-off from access to his or her own information, 
or  to  years'  worth  of  expensive  work-products,  with  no 
opportunity for recovery of that information, is unacceptable 
(TCG  Group,  2009).  The  concept  of  basing  ownership  or 
usage restrictions upon the verifiable identity of a particular 
piece of computing hardware may be perceived by the user as 
problematic if the equipment in question malfunctions.
The TCG only released a specification,  but no conformance 
tests  are  forced  onto  the  vendors.  Up  to  now,  there  is  no 
feasible test methods to judge whether they are compliant to 
TCG specifications or not.  Therefore it may be difficult for 
an end user to tell whether his trusted platform is compliant to 
the whole specification or only to a subset of it  as  there isn’t 
any  a  prototype  with  full  funtion  can  test  TPM.  Non-
corformance  and bugs of  TPM can lead to serious  security 
problems.
Trusted  Computing  requests  that  all  software  and hardware 
vendors  will  follow the technical  specifications  released  by 
the  Trusted  Computing  Group  in  order  to  allow 
interoperability  between  different  trusted  software  stacks. 
However,  even  now  there  are  interoperability  problems 
between  the  TrouSerS  trusted  software  stack  (released  as 
open source software  by IBM) and Hewlett-Packard’s stack 
(TCG  Group,  2009)(Zhang,  Luo,  Yan,  Xu,  He  &  Zhan, 
2008).  Another  problem  is  the  fact  that  the  technical 
specifications are still changing, so it is unclear which is the 
standard implementation of the trusted stack.
An additional issue is that measurements are computed only 
when  the  components  are  loaded:  without  proper  software 
architecture for monitoring the platform resources at run-time, 
nothing  can  be  said  about  the  dynamic  behaviour  of  the 
components.  For  example,  if  a  component  is  altered  by  a 
virus at run-time (i.e. after it has been loaded and measured), 
this fact is not detected (Lioy, Ramunno & Vernizzi, 2007).
The technical  idea underlying  trusted computing  is that  the 
computer includes a digital encryption and signature device, 
and  the  keys  are  kept  secret  by  manufacturers.  Proprietary 
programs will use the TPM to control which other programs 
can be run,  which documents  or  data can be accessed,  and 
what  programs  can  be  pass  them to.  These  programs  will 
continually  download  new  authorization  rules  through  the 
Internet,  and  impose  those  rules  automatically,  refuses  to 
obtain  the  new  rules  periodically  from  the  Internet  might 
causes some capabilities will automatically cease to function 
(Stallman, 2004).
Trusted  computing  puts  the  existence  of  free  operating 
systems and free applications at risk, as TPM will block this 
kind of software. Some versions of trusted computing would 
require the operating system to be specifically authorized by a 
particular  company.  Free  operating  systems  could  not  be 
installed. Some versions of trusted computing would require 
every program to be specifically authorized by the operating 
system developer. To run free applications on such a system 
could be a crime (Stallman, 2004).
A user who wanted to switch to a competing program might 
find that it would be impossible for that new program to read 
old data, as the information would be "locked in" to the old 
program. It could also make it impossible for the user to read 
or  modify their data except as specifically permitted by the 
software.  Remote  attestation  could  cause  other  problems. 
Currently  web sites  can  be  visited  using  a  number  of  web 
browsers, though certain websites may be formatted such that 
some  browsers  cannot  decipher  their  code.  Some  browsers 
have found a way to get around that  problem by emulating 
other browsers. With remote attestation a website could check 
the internet browser being used and refuse to display on any 
browser other than the specified one (like Internet Explorer), 
so even emulating the browser would not work.
One of the early motivations behind trusted computing was a 
desire by media, entertainment and software corporations for 
stricter  DRM  (Digital  Rights  Management)  technology  to 
prevent  users  from  freely  sharing  and  using  potentially 
copyrighted or  private  files without  explicit  permission.  On 
the  other  words,  the  downloaded  videos  and  music  can  be 
played only on one specified computer.  These are examples 
of a more general problem of "lock-in", often practiced as a 
deliberate  business  strategy  in the  software  industry,  to  the 
detriment of business and home computer users alike.
5.0 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The  TCG technical  committee  considered  few intiatives  to 
improve  the  weaknesses  and  risks  from  the  existing  TC 
privacy policies.  The TCG privacy model generally follows 
the privacy guiding principles established by the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) P3P working group6.
5.1 Notice and Communication
Service providers should provide timely and effective notices 
oftheir information practices, and user agents should provide 
effective  tools  for  users  to  access  these  notices  and  make 
decisions based on them (Cranor, 1998).
5.2 Choice & Control
Users should be given the ability to make meaningful choices 
about  the  collection,  use,  and  disclosure  of  personal 
information. TCG is committed to enabling owners and users 
of computing platforms to remain in control of their platform, 
and  to  requiring  platform owners  to  opt  in  to  enable  TCG 
features (Cranor, 1998).
5.3 Fairness and Integrity
Users  should  retain  control  over  their  personal  information 
and  decide  the  conditions  under  which  they  will  share  it. 
Service  providers  should  treat  users  and  their  personal 
information with fairness and integrity.  This is essential  for 
protecting privacy and promoting trust (Cranor, 1998).
5.4 Confidentiality
Users' personal  information should always be protected with 
reasonable security safeguards in keeping with the sensitivity 
of the information (Cranor, 1998).
5.5 Open platform development model
Encourage   the  open  development  model  that  enables  any 
party  to  develop  hardware,  software,  or  system  platforms 
based  on  TCG  specifications,  and  to  preserving  consumer 
freedom of choice (Molsberry & Berger, 2006).
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
The  implementation  of  TC  technology  seems  to  have 
consequences for many people especially related to privacy. 
TC  is  primarily  seen  as  a  threat  to  privacy  as  a  political 
concept,  giving  multinational  companies  access  to 
information we would prefer to keep private. Unsurprisingly, 
the  TC  has  provoked  and  given  rise  to  number  of 
controversies between its proponents  and opponents.  This is 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  aim  of  TCG  will  provide  more 
trustworthiness  from the point  of  view of  software  vendors 
and  the  content  industry,  but  will  be  less  trustworthy   and 
freedom from the point of view of their owners.
Fortunately,  the TCG as  well  as independent  researchers  is 
working seriously to address the limitations and weakness of 
the  TC.  For  instance,  Open  Platform  Development  Model 
initiative will improve TC platform openness and flexibility 
in offering benefits to both vendors and users. TC can be very 
useful for secure infrastructure commons if its limitations and 
critical points are carefully taken into account and ultimately 
will covert  all  the challenges to opportunities in which will 
develop a better secured community.
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